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1 Introduction
Firms exporting high-quality (price) products have high revenue, access a large number of
destination markets and pay high wages (e.g., Verhoogen 2008, Crozet, Head and Mayer 2012,
Manova and Zhang 2012). Recent theoretical works show that producing these high-quality
products require high-quality inputs (i.e., Kugler and Verhoogen 2012, Hallak and Sivadasan
-forthcoming). While upgrading exports quality may help firms enter profitable developed
countries market, accessing high-quality inputs may be too costly for producers, especially in
developping countries. We argue that firms may take advantage of input-trade liberalization to
upgrade the quality of their imported inputs in order to upgrade the quality of their exported
products.
This paper is the first provide empirical evidence on the link between input-trade liberal-
ization and the quality of traded products. We capture a causal effect between exogenous input
tariff reductions and changes in imported inputs and exported product prices by exploring the
evolution of prices within firms at the HS6 (harmonized system) product level in a period of
trade liberalization. We first show that following a decrease in input tariffs, firms import more
varieties of inputs - if the input originates from the most advanced economies. As input tariffs
fall, firms also pay a higher price for their imported inputs at the HS6 level. This effect is two
times higher for firms sourcing their inputs from high-income countries. We interpret these
findings as the firms upgrade of their imported inputs quality in a period of trade liberaliza-
tion. This result could also be explained by a lack of competition among suppliers of foreign
inputs taking advantage of the tariff cuts to increase their prices or by an exogenous increase
in the price of commodities. We show that our findings are not driven by these alternative
explanations.
The input-trade liberalization also results in an increase of firms HS6 exported product
prices. Such impact of input tariffs reduction on export prices is specific to inputs imported
from the most advanced economies and to products that are exported to the highest income
countries. Our results suggest that the increase in firms exported product prices reflects an
improvement in product quality. The alternative explanation of higher markups is difficult
to reconcile with the increase in imported input prices and the facts that only imports from
advanced countries and exports towards high-income countries are relevant to explain the
increase in export prices. Schott (2004), Hallak and Schott (2011) and Khandelwal (2010)
actually find that export quality is correlated with the destination country income level. We
also verify that our results are not driven by demand shocks nor increased marginal costs and
provide evidence that we have indeed identified a quality upgrading effect. Our findings are
in line with a scenario according to which trade liberalization allows firms to upgrade their
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inputs at low cost in order to quality upgrade their exported products.
We rely on an original methodology which allows us to identify causal links between cuts
in input tariffs and trade prices. We take advantage of a detailed and unique database of
Chinese firms’ trade data for the 2000-2006 period that includes two essential features for our
analysis. First, it covers the Chinese accession to the WTO in 2001 which led to an important
decrease in tariffs. Second, it characterizes trade transaction according to a dual regime where
some firms are exempt from paying tariffs. Chinese trade transactions are recorded according
to their trade regimes: firms importing under the “ordinary” regime pay tariffs, whereas firms
importing under the “processing” regime have been exempted from paying tariffs for over 30
years. In order to obtain the processing status, firms must export all the output produced
with imported inputs. This dual trade regime is crucial to our approach as it allows us to rely
on a quasi-natural experiment where firms not subject to tariffs stand as the control group
thereby alleviating concerns related to potential endogeneity issues.1
Our identification strategy exploits both the variation in input tariffs and the existence of a
control group composed of processing firms that export the same variety (product-destination
pair) in the same year as ordinary firms. With imported inputs prices as variable of interest,
we rely on the variation of input tariffs across HS6 products and time. In order to capture
the impact of input-trade liberalization on exported product prices, we construct firm level
input tariffs. Firm specific input tariffs are calculated as a weighted average of the tariffs paid
by the firm on the inputs it actually uses, with a constant weighting over time. These tariff
measures reflect the firm’s input mix and capture the HS6 input tariff variations. Moreover,
they are free of composition and reverse causality problems related to the change of weights
over time.
An important concern is the potential endogeneity between tariffs change and the imports
or exports of firms. We address this issue in several ways. We first show that the input tariffs
reduction is exogenous to the firms expected imports/exports patterns and political lobbying.
We are also concerned with the quality of our control group. We ensure that for each ordinary
firm there is at least one processig firm exporting the same HS6 product to the same destination
in the same year. Importantly, we show that the firms’ processing status is exogenous to the
level of input tariffs. Firm-product fixed effects included in the estimation help control for
differences between ordinary and processing firms; they do not however capture time-varying
features, other than input tariffs, that affect ordinary and processing firms differently. We thus
perform several robustness checks. We include in the estimation a time trend by trade status
1The literature so far has shown a positive correlation across firms between input and output prices (Kugler
and Verhoogen, 2012, Manova and Zhang 2012, Hallak and Sivadasan - forthcoming), these cross-section analyses
do not however assess causality.
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in order to capture status specific paths or shocks over the sampled period (i.e., we interact
firms’ type -ordinary or processing- with a time dummy). Moreover, we run the estimation on
firms of similar size or excluding foreign firms (highly represented in processing) or non-private
firms (highly represented in ordinary) as well as specific sectors such as textile or electronics.
We also ensure that changes in export prices are not associated with demand shocks nor
increased marginal costs. We provide evidence that we have indeed identified a quality up-
grading effect relying on the methodology developed by Khandelwal (2010) and Khandelwal,
Schott and Wei (forthcoming). Finally, we carried out several robustness tests that show that
our estimates are not driven either by the measure of input tariff nor our sample. All our find-
ings are robust to alternative explanations and sensitivity tests that could explain the increase
in export prices within firm-product across destinations and over time.
In addition to the literature on the determinants of export price variation in cross-section,
i.e., within-product across firms or within product-firm across markets (see Bastos and Silva
2010, Gorg, Halpern and Murakovy 2010, Kugler and Verhoogen 2012, Martin 2012, Manova
and Zhang 2012 and Harrigan, Ma and Shlychkov 2012), this paper also contributes to the
literature on trade liberalization and firm-performance. Most of the literature focuses on
productivity and investigates the effect of a decrease in tariffs on firms’ total factor productivity
(TFP) (e.g., Pavnick 2002, Schor 2004, Fernandes 2007, Amiti and Konings 2007, Topalova and
Khandelwal 2010, Brandt et al. 2012). These papers find that there is a positive impact from
cuts in output tariffs on productivity (the pro-competitive effect) and an even stronger impact
from a decrease in input tariffs (the imported inputs channel). Other studies relate imported
inputs and firms’ TFP but do not consider trade liberalization (e.g., Kasahara and Rodrigue
2008, Halpern, Koren and Szeidl 2009). Bas (2012), Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavnick and
Topalova (2011), and Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2012) explore the impact of trade liberalization
on the other attributes of the firms. They show that trade liberalization entails a large increase
in firms product and export scopes. None of these papers however examine the role of trade
liberalization on firms’ imported inputs and export prices and investigate quality upgrading in
a period of trade liberalization. Few papers empirically study the relationship between trade,
prices and markups. Those that do focus on the pro-competitive effect (i.e., Fernandes and
Paunov, 2011, Amiti and Khandelwal - forthcoming) or examine output prices and markups
(i.e., De Loecker et al. 2012). We differ from these works by focusing on the role of input
tariff reduction on export prices (i.e, the imported input channel) and by identifying a causal
link between input trade liberalization and traded product prices.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the literature and provides a theo-
retical motivation for our work; Section 3 presents the Chinese trade liberalization and dual
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trade regime, explores the data and discusses the empirical strategy; Section 4 reports our
main results regarding the impact of inputs trade liberalization on firms’ imported inputs and
exported product prices; Section 5 proposes alternative explanations to the quality upgrading
pattern and discusses our findings; Section 6 presents several robustness checks. Section 7
concludes.
2 Theoretical motivation
Our analysis of export price variations relies on the idea that consumers value quality. Firms
compete on quality as well as on price on export markets. Furthermore, since quality is
expensive to produce, a rise in export price may be associated with an increase in demand:
consumers are willing to pay a premium for higher quality goods. Linder’s (1961) early work
already noted the role of quality as a determinant of the direction of trade arguing that richer
countries spend a larger share of their income on high-quality goods. Recent empirical work
corroborates this idea. On the supply side, Schott (2004) and Hummels and Klenow (2005)
show that export prices are correlated with exporters income per capita. Hallak and Schott
(2011) as well as Khandelwal (2010) - in influential papers distinguishing price and quality
- confirm this link between export quality and level of development. On the demand side,
Hallak (2006) finds that demand for quality is related to importers’ income per capita: richer
countries import relatively more from countries producing high-quality goods.
Recent firm-level empirical studies find that firms that export are bigger and charge higher
prices (e.g., Hallak and Sivadasan -forthcoming-, Kugler and Verhoogen 2012, Crozet, Head
and Mayer 2012, Manova and Zhang 2012, Iacovone and Javorcik 2010) and evidence a positive
relationship between export prices and distance to destination (Baldwin and Harrigan 2011).
While standard models of heterogeneous firms (henceforth HFs) a la Melitz (2003) and Bernard
et al. (2003) cannot describe this patterns, a new and growing literature explores the role of
product quality in explaining these observed features (Baldwin and Harrigan 2011, Hallak
and Sivadasan -forthcoming-, Crozet, Head and Mayer 2012, Johnson 2012, Verhoogen 2008,
Kugler and Verhoogen 2012).2 In these models quality is costly to produce and consumers are
willing to pay a higher price for high-quality varieties.
Most models assume a representative consumer who maximizes a CES utility function:
U =
( ∫
iΩ
(xiqi)
σ−1
σ di
) σ
σ−1
where xi and qi denotes the quantity consumed and the quality of
a typical variety i, σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across varieties and Ω is the set of all
varieties available in the market. These preferences yield demand for a specific variety which
2HF models predict that more productive firms charge lower prices, and consequently, have higher revenues
and profits to afford the fixed export cost and self-select into export market.
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depends on the differentiated goods price but also on its quality: xi = p
−σ
i q
σ−1
i P
σ−1E where
pi is the price of the variety i and P and E correspond to the aggregate quality-adjusted price
index and expenditure in the export market. Quality thus acts as a demand shifter; it can
be understood as any product attribute that is valued by the consumer. On the production
side, the models used differ in the way they introduce product quality differentiation but they
all share the common feature that producing high-quality goods is costly with marginal costs
increasing in the level of quality of the final good.
Although the profit maximizing output price increases with the level of product quality,
high-price, high-quality firms generate high profit than their lower capability counterparts.
This occurs because the increase in utility resulting from the consumption of higher quality
products more than compensates for the higher production costs. As exporting firms incur
a fixed cost, these models provide a convincing framework to explain why exporters produce
higher quality goods and charge higher output prices (e.g., Verhoogen 2008, Kugler and Ver-
hoogen 2012) as well as why export prices are higher in more distant (Baldwin and Harrigan,
2011) and more difficult to enter (Jonhson, 2012) destination markets.
Kluger and Verhoogen’s (2012) paper is of particular interest for our analysis as they model
the link between the quality of intermediate inputs and the quality of final goods. The authors
derive two functional forms for quality in a model where output quality is endogenous and
firms optimize their quality choice. In the first case, they assume that firm capability and
input quality are complements in the production of output quality. In the second case, output
quality depends on input quality and also implies a fixed cost for quality investment. In the
intermediate input sector, producing higher quality inputs is more costly in terms of labor.
Consequently, for the final goods producers, the quality of intermediate inputs and the price
of that input are positively correlated. In both variants of their model, in equilibrium, higher
capability firms use high-quality inputs to produce high-quality outputs. Higher-quality inputs
have a higher price, which raises marginal costs. If the scope for quality differentiation is large
(a long quality ladder in Khandelwal’s terms), Kugler and Verhoogen’s (2012) model predicts a
positive relationship between output price, input prices and plant size. Recent working papers
theoretically examine the impact of trade liberalization on exported product quality. Fan and
Li (2013) endogeneize firms’ choice of the number and quality of imported inputs in period of
tariffs reduction and find that firms increase both the number and quality of inputs, leading to
an increase in export quality.3 Similarly, in a theoretical North-South model of heterogeneous
firms and quality upgrading, Demir (2012) extends the framework of Kugler and Verhoogen
3Fan and Li (2013) test their model using Chinese data. They however rely on cross-section analysis and do
not explore the causal link between input tariffs reduction and imported inputs and exported product prices in
their analysis - something which we do in the present paper.
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(2012) and shows the mechanisms through which input-trade liberalization leads to export
quality upgrading of firms located in the South.
We refer to this recent literature product quality at the firm level to guide our empirical
analysis of the impact of input-trade liberalization on traded good prices. The Chinese tariff
cuts reduce the cost of imported intermediate goods. Chinese firms may use this opportunity
to buy higher-quality (higher-priced) inputs in order to upgrade the quality of their final
goods. They then become more competitive (quality wise) on export markets, which may be
particularly relevant in high income destination countries.4
3 Data and empirical strategy
3.1 China trade liberalization
The period under study, 2000-2006, corresponds both to a drastic increase in Chinese foreign
trade (e.g., the yearly export growth increased by 50% over the period) and to a significant
episode of trade liberalization. Following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in December 2001, the authorities undertook a series of important commitments to
open and liberalize the economy and to offer a more predictable environment for trade and
foreign investment. The government gradually reduced tariffs, non-tariff measures, licenses and
quotas. Between 2001 and 2006, applied Chinese tariffs declined on average by 7 percentage
points with a wide variation in tariff changes across manufacturing industries (Table A1 in the
Appendix reports the reduction in tariffs for aggregated sectors).
Importantly, as mentioned by Brandt et al. (2012), the large disparity in sectoral tariffs
in the early years diminished over the period as high tariffs converged to a more uniform
(low) level after accession to the WTO. Figure A1 in the Appendix reflects this convergence
in tariffs. The share of HS6 products facing tariffs above 20% declines from 32.7% in 2000 to
12.5% in 2006. In contrast, the share of HS6 products with tariffs below 5% increased from
6.8% in 2000 to 16.7% in 2006. We make use of this sectoral discrepancy in tariff reductions
to capture the impact of trade liberalization on import and export prices.
China’s trade policy is characterized by a dual system which distinguishes two main trade
regimes depending on the type of goods traded (Feenstra, 1998, Branstetter and Lardy, 2006).
Traded goods are reported as “ordinary goods” or “processing goods”. Ordinary goods are
made up of imports of goods that are sold domestically or exported, whereas processing goods
consist of imports of intermediate goods that are processed and sold on the export market
4As mentioned by Fajgelbaum, Grossman and Helpman (2011), low quality firms in developing countries
may find it difficult to access the profitable developed countries markets.
7
only.5 Since 1979, firms importing products under the processing trade regime have been
exempt from paying tariffs. This legal framework provided incentives to produce for the
export markets. On the contrary, until recently, ordinary goods were subject to high levels of
nominal tariffs. This dual system is key to our analysis as the impact of the WTO accession
differs for ordinary and processing importers. Indeed, the tariff reduction affects only ordinary
goods, whereas processing goods are traded freely.
3.2 Data
Our dataset is a panel of Chinese manufacturing firms for the 2000-2006 period. We rely
on transaction data from the Chinese Customs Trade Statistics (CCTS) database which is
compiled by the General Administration of Customs of China. This database includes monthly
firm level imports and exports at the 8-digit HS product-level. Trade data are reported free
on board (f.o.b.) in US dollars. We collapse the data to yearly frequency, aggregate product
data at the 6-digit HS level and deflate them using 2-digit HS level deflators from Upward,
Wang and Zheng (2010).6 The database also records the country of origin of imports as well
as the destination of exports and contains firm specific information such as name, address or
custom regimes. Transactions are classified according to 18 different custom regimes which
vary in their tariffs levels. This information is essential for our work. We rely on three
regimes: “ordinary trade”, “processing and assembly trade” and “processing with imported
materials trade”. Imports under the processing trade regime concern raw material, parts and
components but exclude capital goods and equipments. This regime is also separated from
the “warehousing trade” and “entrepot trade” regimes. Transactions registered under the
processing trade regime correspond to imported inputs that are used in the production of
goods for export markets. In contrast with those in ordinary trade, imports under processing
trade regimes are not subject to tariffs.7 Ordinary and processing trade encompasses 76%
(96%) of total manufacturing imports (exports) on average over the period.
We restrict our sample to firms importing intermediate inputs through either the ordinary
or the processing trade regime.8 Imports under processing trade regime are necessarily inter-
mediate inputs as they are used for the purpose of processing exports. Imports under ordinary
5As mentioned in Manova and Yu (2012), a processing firm must show proofs of a contractual agreement
with a foreign buyer to whom it will export the good in order to obtain the exemption on input tariffs.
6Such modifications are necessary in order to match transaction data with tariffs. Within HS6 codes, HS8
products may be measured in different units (e.g., kilogrammes or meters). In order to avoid adding “apples with
oranges”, we drop HS8 products that differ in measurement from the rest of the HS6 category. It represents less
than 0.77% of the sample. Finally, as the HS classification changed over time, we convert older classifications
(i.e., HS1-1996 and HS2-2002) into HS0-1988/1992 classification using WITS conversion tables.
7For more information on these custom regimes refer to Table A2 in the Appendix.
8We exclude from the estimated sample HS6 products higher than 980,000 corresponding to services and
wholesalers and HS6 products lower than 100,630 corresponding to animal products and vegetables commodities.
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trade however include both intermediate and final goods. In order to identify the intermediate
inputs, we use the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification from the United Nations
that classifies HS6 products into final, intermediate and capital goods. These intermediate
goods correspond to 70% of all imports (under the ordinary trade regime) on average over the
period. We classify firms that import all their inputs for the year under the ordinary trade
regime as ordinary importers. Similarly, firms importing all their inputs under processing
trade regimes are defined as processing importers. By relying on these restrictive definitions,
we exclude firms buying foreign inputs under both trade regimes. Most firms (94% of the total
firms importing inputs) however import intermediate goods under one trade regime only.9
Our identification strategy relies on a quasi-natural experiment that exploits differences in
firm-product export prices over time and across destinations associated with changes in input
tariffs over time and across firms, using processing firms that are not subject to tariffs as a
control group. To ensure that processing firms are an appropriate control group we rely on
processing firms with similar characteristics to ordinary firms in terms of export patterns -
We require that, for each ordinary firm and year, there is at least one processing firm that
exports the same HS6 product to the same destination. We thus exclude from the estimated
sample observations for ordinary firms for which there is no control group (i.e., no counterpart
processing firm exporting the same variety to the same market).
Our estimated sample is an unbalanced panel of firms that export HS6-level products and
are either ordinary importers of intermediate inputs or processing importers of intermediate
inputs for the entire period. The sample increases from 18,493 firms in 2000 to 36,013 in
2006. On average, we have 10,517 ordinary firms and 15,289 processing firms per year. Our
estimated sample corresponds to 60% of the full sample of firms that export and import. Most
of the difference in sample size is a consequence of our matching procedure which requires that
for each treated firm (ordinary) there is at least one control firm (processing) at the product-
destination-year level. Our estimated sample presents an appropriate representativeness of the
full sample in term of sectoral decomposition (see Table A3 in the Appendix for descriptive
statistics). We begin by exploring the effects of tariff reductions at the HS6 product level on
firm-product imported input prices. For this, we have an estimated sample of firms importing
up to 3,107 products from 156 countries of origin corresponding to 2,286,393 observations
at the firm-product-country of origin level over the sample period. Firms export up to 2,511
products across 178 destinations. With regards to the main specifications - using export prices
as dependent variable - we work with an unbalanced panel of 3,208,484 firms-HS6-product-
country of destination and year observations. Despite the unbalanced nature of our panel, the
9We exclude firms that switch from ordinary to processing status over time (these firms correspond to less
than 4% of the firms in the sample).
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number of ordinary and processing firms present in our estimation sample is similar. Indeed,
we study changes in import and export prices for 38,234 unique ordinary firms and 39,091
unique processing firms present over the period.
To provide a first illustration of the change in export and import prices over the trade
liberalization period, we present the distribution of prices in 2000 and 2006 in Figure 1. We
include only firm-product pairs present in both years in order to capture the evolution of prices
within firm-product. We regress prices on firm-product fixed effects and plot the residual.10
The left panel of Figure 1 shows the distribution of import prices while the right panel of
Figure 1 represents the distribution of export prices. Both graphs reveal a right shift in
the distribution indicating an increase in imported input prices and export prices over the
period. This paper explores whether these post trade liberalization increase in imported input
and export prices are related, and whether these observed patterns can be interpreted as an
upgrade in quality.
Figure 1: Distribution of import and export prices in 2000 and 2006
0
. 5
1
1
. 5
2
D
e
n
s
i t
y
-1 -.5 0 .5 1
ln_price
2000 2006
0
. 5
1
1
. 5
D
e
n
s
i t
y
-2 -1 0 1 2
ln_price
2000 2006
Source: Author’s calculation.
3.3 Empirical strategy
3.3.1 Trade liberalization and imported input prices
China’s accession to the WTO in December 2001 provides an interesting framework of uni-
lateral trade liberalization. The specificity of the Chinese dual trade regime - where ordinary
firms are directly affected by trade reform while processing firms are not - represents a unique
natural experiment within which to investigate the impact of trade policy. We exploit the
change in import tariff combined with the characteristics of the dual trade system in order to
test the effects of the liberalization of inputs trade on imported input prices.
10In Figure 1 outliers at the top and bottom 1st percentiles are excluded from the database. Alternative
trimming and no trimming at all provide similar results which are available upon request.
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The main estimation strategy is similar to a difference-in-difference approach where ordi-
nary importers are the treated group and processing importers are the control group.11 Thanks
to the control group, we are able to account for (sectoral or regional) policies that affect ordi-
nary and processing importer similarly. We thus introduce into the analysis a dummy variable
which takes the value of one when the firm trades under the ordinary regime. We first focus
on the impact of input-trade liberalization on the (f.o.b.) price of the firm’s imported inputs.
The dummy variable is interacted with the tariff of the imported input at the HS6 product
level. We use the Most Favorite Nation (henceforth MFN) applied tariffs set by China to the
rest of the world. Chinese MFN tariffs at the HS6 level come from the WITS (World Bank)
database for the 2000-2006 period. We consider the following specification:
P IMikct = β1Ordinaryi∗τk,t−1 +β2Ordinaryi+β3τk,t−1 +β4Xi,t−1 +β5Zc,t−1 +αik+αt+αc+ηikct
(1)
where P IMikct corresponds to the log of the import price (unit value) for input k for firm i
from country c at time t and τkt−1 is the tariff on input k at time t−1 for firms that import this
HS6 level product. Ordinaryi is a dummy variable indicating whether firm i is an ordinary
or a processing importer, it takes a value of one if the firm is ordinary and zero otherwise.
Xit−1 control for firm i size defined by quartiles of size distribution based on the number of
imported varieties with the first quartile (Q1) representing the smallest firms and the fourth
quartile (Q4) the omitted category. Zct−1 controls for origin country variables such as real
exchange rate (RER) or GDP. αik, αt, and αc are firm-product, time and origin-country fixed
effects and ηikct an i.i.d. component. Note that the dummy variable Ordinaryi does not vary
within firms over time.12 Because of its colinearity with firm-product fixed effect, it will drop
from the estimation. We cluster standard error at the firm-product level.
3.3.2 Trade liberalization and export prices
Next, we investigate the impact of input-trade liberalization on the firm export prices. The
dummy for ordinary is interacted with the input tariff of the firm. Firm level input tariffs are
computed as a weighted average of tariffs on the inputs used by the firm, where the weights
are constant over the period: τit =
∑
k αkτkt, where τkt is the output tariff of HS6-product
k in t and k is used in the production of the final output of firm i. We rely on a constant
weight αk computed as the average weight of a specific HS6 product import value over the
11This is not a traditional difference-in-difference estimation as the treatment (i.e., the decrease in input
tariffs) affect the treated group over time.
12Recall that the estimated sample is composed by firms that import all their inputs through either the
ordinary or the processing trade regime for the entire period.
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period. There are two main advantages of using an average constant weight to compute firm
level input tariffs. First, this measure is free of potential reverse causality concerns between
changes in firm-product export prices and variations in the imported input mix over time.
Second, our measure of firm level input tariff avoids potential biased estimates stemming from
changes in the composition of the input mix over time due to input tariff reductions.13 The
firm level input tariffs have decreased substantially over the period with a wide discrepancy
across firms: The average input tariff decreased by about 6 percentage points (reaching up to
39 percentage points for some firms), a 43% drop, between 2000 and 2006 with most of the
tariff cuts occurring between 2002 and 2004.14 We focus on the following specification:
PEXikct = δ1Ordinaryi ∗τi,t−1 +δ2Ordinaryi+δ3τi,t−1 +δ4Xi,t−1 +δ5Zc,t−1 +αik+αt+αc+ηikct
(2)
where PEXikct is the log of export price (unit value) of firm i for product k in country c at
time t and τit−1 is the input tariff faced by firm i at time t − 1. Ordinaryi is the dummy
variable indicating the firm i importer status, Xit−1 control for firm i size and Zct−1 controls
for real exchange rate (RER) or GDP at destination. αik, αt, and αc are firm-product, time
and destination/origin-country fixed effects and ηikct an i.i.d. component.
15 In specification
(2), τi,t−1 is a firm level variable which is zero for processing firms (these firms do not pay the
tariff). It is thus prefectly colinear with the interaction term between Ordinaryi and firm-level
tariffs, and will drop from the estimation.
By including firm-product level fixed effects, we capture the impact of input-trade liberal-
ization on within firm-products prices over time and across destinations. We therefore identify
causality effects between input tariffs cut and imported input and exported product prices. As
firm-product is our most important dimension, we cluster standard errors at the firm-product
level.16 Note that all our results are robust to clustering at the firm-year level as well as to
multi-way clustering with standard errors clustered at the firm, HS6 product and country level
following the methodology described by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2011). Our baseline
results using these alternatives clustering are presented in Section 6.
13Section 6.1 discusses drawbacks and advantages of our measure of firm level input tariffs more extensively.
14The average input tariff decreased by 16.2% between 2002 and 2003, and by 19.8% between 2003 and 2004.
15As shown by Manova and Zhang (2012), Martin (2012), Harrigan, Ma and Shlychkov (2012) among others,
there are substantial variations in firm-product export prices across destination markets. A cut in input tariffs
may impact firm-product prices differently across destinations. We therefore decided not to limit our within
firm-product-destination estimation and let firm-product export prices vary across export markets.
16Data limitations (no information on the allocation of inputs for multi-products firms) unabled us to com-
pute firm-product input tariffs. Firm-product standard errors might however be correlated over time across
destinations (origins). We thus cluster standard errors at the firm-product level.
12
3.4 Endogeneity of trade policy
Previous studies (e.g., Schor, 2004, Goldberg et al, 2010, Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011)
used Input-Output (IO) tables in order to compute the input tariff measure. Such tariffs are
constructed using aggregate data (IO) tables are not usually more disaggregated than the HS3
level) and generate industry-level input tariffs which are then matched to the firm’s sector
of activity. As in Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2012), we exploit the disaggregated nature of our
database by constructing an index of input tariffs which rely on output tariffs and import
data at the HS6 level. Since the tariffs are generated from the firm’s effective use of a specific
imported input, we obtain a more precise measure of input tariffs computed at the firm level.
We rely on weighted average tariffs across the firm’s HS6 imported inputs - with the weights
being constant for the entire period in order to address issues related to changes in the firm
imported input mix. All our results are robust to the use of constant inital weights and IO
tariffs.17
In order to address issues of endogeneity between changes in exports prices and trade policy,
we must verify that tariffs were set independently of industries’ expected exports and lobbying
activities. If policy makers lower tariffs based on sectoral trade performance, we could run into
serious causality issues. Higher tariff reduction could indeed be granted for sectors with the
best performance on export markets and/or sectors which require large amount of imported
inputs. Several arguments however alleviate this concern of the endogeneity of trade policy.
According to Branstetter and Lardy (2008), the Chinese authorities’ decision to join the
WTO was mainly motivated by the domestic reform agenda and willingness to become a
market economy. WTO tariff reductions are thus unlikely to be related to lobby pressures of
less-efficient industries looking for lasting protections. Similarly, Brandt et al. (2012) argue
that the convergence in tariffs over the period is more likely to reflect a willingness to reach
low tariffs in all sectors rather than a selective allocation of tariff reduction in response to
sector performances or lobbying activities.
As a further test of the exogeneity of input tariffs, we follow Topalova and Khandelwal
(2011) and examine the correlation of tariff changes with initial industry performance. Tariff
cuts after 2001 are fixed in the accession agreement; we therefore use data for 2000 in order to
capture initial sectoral performances. We regress changes in input tariffs on a number of indus-
try characteristics computed as the size-weighted average of firms’ characteristics for the first
year. The firm-level data for 2000 comes from the Chinese Industry Statistical Database from
HuaMei Information (HMI), provided by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC).18
17Section 6.1 reports the results obtained with these alternative measures of input tariffs.
18The NBSC collects yearly data from all state-owned firms as well as from firms with other ownership types
and annual sales above 5 million RMB. The database includes about 163,000 firms for 2000 and accounts for
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In order to compile our database, we rely on firm’s name and address which are reported both
in the (CCTS) custom-transaction and the (NBSC) firm-level databases. Industry charac-
teristics include: value added, use of intermediate inputs, investment, a value-added based
Herfindhal index measuring industry concentration, exports and imports as well as the share
of processing and of state-owned firms. Table 1 shows no statistical correlation between input
tariffs and industry characteristics pre-WTO accession. This result suggests little discretion
in trade policy across sectors which is consistent with an exogenous input tariff reduction.
Table 1: Exogenous tariff changes to initial industry characteristics
Change in tariffs Observations R-squared
Value added (2000) 0.0022 378 0.251
(0.003)
Intermediate inputs (2000) -0.0016 388 0.247
(0.003)
Investment (2000) -0.0005 241 0.279
(0.002)
Herfindhal index (2000) -0.0001 389 0.251
(0.001)
Exports (2000) -0.0004 389 0.251
(0.001)
Imports (2000) -0.0000 389 0.250
(0.001)
Share processing (2000) -0.0030 389 0.251
(0.008)
Share state-owned (2000) -0.0013 389 0.251
(0.009)
Notes: The table presents the results of regressing changes in input tariffs between 2000 and 2006 at the 4-digit
industry level on 4-digit industry characteristics in the initial year (2000). Value added (2000), intermediate
inputs (2000), investment(2000), exports (2000) and imports (2000) are computed as the average of all firms
producing in the same 4-digit industry. Herfindhal (2000) measure concentration in value added. All these
variables are expressed in logarithmic form. Share processing (2000) and share state-owned (2000) correspond
to the share of processing (resp. state-owned) firms at the 4-digit industry level. All estimations include 2-digit
industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
3.5 Processing firms as controls
We ensure that our control group is similar to our treated group in term of export patterns
by requiring that each ordinary firm has at least one corresponding processing firm at the
product-destination-year level. In Section 6.2, we show that our results do not depend on
intrinsic differences between ordinary and processing firms in term of size, sector/product
characteristics and firm-ownership. One endogeneity concern however remains.
Using processing firms as a control group for ordinary firms indeed raises the crucial ques-
tion of endogeneity in the trade status of firms. Endogeneity is present if firms decide to
function as processing firms (i.e., pure exporters) in sectors where input tariffs are high. In-
deed, if input tariffs are excessive, a firm may find it profitable not to serve the domestic
market in order to benefit from the duty-free processing trade status.19 Such hypothesis how-
95% of total industrial output value.
19Note that tariffs reached up to 90% for products belonging to HS4 sector 8703 (Motors cars and other
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ever requires that firms have the ability to chose their status freely at low cost, which seems
unlikely in China over the period considered.
The processing trade status was first implemented to develop export oriented sectors
through foreign invested entreprises (FIEs) importing (freely) capital equipment, managerial
know-how and technology. Chinese firms were only granted the right to obtain the processing
trade status in the 90s. Although the processing trade status was first authorized in specific
free-trade zones, Yu and Tian (2012) state that by 2010 only 22% of China’s processing im-
ports was actually located in these zones. The distribution of processing trade certificates
remains regulated by the authorities and requires several administrative steps. It may imply
stopping the production for several month in order to go through customs auditing. The Chi-
nese government also imposes directions for the allocation of the processing trade status. For
example, in 2006, as part of the 11th Five-Year program, the Chinese government - aiming to
upgrade the product structure of processing trade - changed its trade policy; it placed high
energy consumption, high pollution, high resource consumption and low value-added products
into prohibited and restricted categories under the status. According to the Hong Kong Trade
Development Council (2012), processing factories handling products newly reclassified within
the prohibited categories practically lost their licenses to continue producing.20 Note that
within firms at the product level, we observe very few changes in status: 5% switched from
the ordinary to the processing status over the period and 7% did the reverse. This reflects
an important stability in firms’ trade status over time.21 We thus believe that Chinese firms
lack information and freedom to make choices on their trade status in response to the level of
tariffs.
Moreover, while processing firms benefit from duty-free trade, they are not allowed to
sale their products within China. This is a stringent constraint. In effect, at least until the
late 90s, the domestic market stayed highly protected, creating what Feenstra (2008) called an
example of “one country, two systems”; the export-promotion and import-substitution regimes
co-existed. Doing business within China implied much less competitive pressure than accessing
foreign markets. The incentive of Chinese firms to become processing exporters in order to
benefit from the input duty-free is thus not obvious. In fact the proportion of ordinary firms
remained high in most sectors. For example, in electrical machinery, which is one of the largest
vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons), or 57.5% for products of HS4 sector 4001 (Natural
Rubber) or even 45% for products of HS4 sector 6908 (Glazed Ceramic and Tiles) in 2000). Several agricultural
products (especially cereals and oils and fats have tariffs between 90% and 120%).
20These government restrictions on the distribution of processing trade certificates illustrate the regulatory
power of authority as well as the constraints faced by individual firms wishing to change their status. As the
change occurred late 2006, it does not affect our data which cover the 2000-2006 period.
21Note that 4% of firms switched status for at least one of their products over the period. In these cases, we
no longer considered them a “pure” ordinary or processing firm and dropped them from our database.
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processing sectors and has attracted a lot of foreign firms benefiting from the inputs duty-free,
the share of processing firms is only of 44% (note that the corresponding share in value is
much larger reaching 87%).
The average share of exports value under processing trade is slightly higher than 50% and
has been quite stable since the mid-90s (see Yu and Tian 2012). Importantly, the share of
processing exporters varies widely across sectors and does not depend on the sector’s input
tariff level. The left panel of Figure 2 shows the relative number of processing firms by HS6
sectors and the corresponding average HS6 input tariff level. As many firms are multiproduct,
a firm’s sector is defined according to its main HS6 export sector (i.e., highest HS6 export
value). Input tariffs are calculated as explained in Section 3.3.2. Each firm is thus associated
with a specific input tariff and a main HS6 export product. The HS6 input tariff level in the
figures corresponds to the average input tariffs of all firms exporting the same HS6 product.
In the right panel, we present the share of HS6 processing exports in value instead of num-
ber of firms. Both figures clearly show no obvious positive correlation between the share of
processing exports (in number or value) and the level of input tariffs. In order to account
for the multiproduct aspect of the firms, we also computed similar shares defining a firm’s
main export sector at the HS4 and HS3 levels. The figures obtained are similar to the ones
presented here.
Figure 2: Share of hs6 processing export in term of the hs6 tariffs, 2000.
Source: Author’s calculation using unweighted average tariff rates from WITS.
Due to the level of regulation in the attribution of processing trade certificates, the relative
advantage of producing for the non-competitive home market and the absence of correlation
between the choice of trade status and the input tariffs at the sector level, we are quite confident
that the choice of being a processing importer-exporter is not endogenous to the tariffs level.
Section 5.1.1 adresses the potential issue of specific shocks affecting ordinary and processing
firms differently over the period (e.g., different policies across firms statuses leading to different
16
evolution of import and export prices for ordinary or processing firms), while Section 6.2 deals
with potential intrinsic differences between ordinary and processing firms by controlling for
size, sectors and ownership in addition to product and destination across the treated and
control groups.
4 The impact of input-trade liberalization on imported input
and export prices
4.1 Imported inputs and trade liberalization
Theoretical models show that firms upgrade the quality of their final goods and exported
products by raising the quality of their intermediate goods. In order to do so, firms increase
the number of varieties they import, thus reaching a better complementarity of inputs (Ethier
1982), and they import higher quality inputs from the most advanced economies (Kluger and
Verhoogen 2012 and Demir 2012).
We are interested in the impact of input-trade liberalization on imported input and ex-
ported product prices. Following an input tariffs cut, the price of intermediate goods (exclud-
ing the tariff) may increase if firms upgrade the quality of their inputs. We first investigate
how ordinary firms modified their imports of intermediate goods following China accession
to the WTO. As explained above, we exploit the uniqueness of our database by performing
a quasi-natural experiment where ordinary firms stand as the treated group and processing
firms as the control group. As a first insight on the effect of the reduction of input tariffs
on firms’ imports, we regress the log of the firm’s number of imported varieties (defined as a
product-origin country pair) on firm-level input tariffs interacted with the firm’s type dummy.
Table 2 shows that the reduction in tariff is associated with an increase in the number
of varieties imported. Interestingly, the decrease in input tariffs has no effect on the number
of varieties imported from developing countries (LDC) whereas it increases the number of
varieties imported from developed countries (DC).22 These results are in line with a story
where exporters take advantage of the cut in tariffs to reach a better complementarity of
high-quality inputs.23
Table 3 explores the impact of input-trade liberalization on imported input prices account-
ing for the product-origin country dimension of the data (i.e., whereas Table 2 is at the firm
level, Table 3 is at the firm-product-origin level). We follow the empirical strategy exposed in
22Developing countries correspond to non high-income countries, defined by the World Bank as countries
with 2007 per-capita GNIs under $11,456 computed in U.S. dollars using the Atlas conversion factor.
23Recall that we are working with MNF tariffs. This rules out the possibility that the tariffs cut be higher
for DC than LDC countries.
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Table 2: Input tariffs and imported input varieties
N imported N imported N imported
varieties varieties DC varieties LDC
(1) (2) (3)
Tariff(t-1)× ordinary -0.558*** -0.742*** -0.193
(0.100) (0.107) (0.206)
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes
Observations 176,601 167,009 67,911
R-squared 0.868 0.858 0.846
Notes: Table 2 presents the results of the following equation: numbit = β1Ordinaryi ∗ τi,t−1 + β2τi,t−1 + αi +
αt + ηit where numbit correspond to the log of the number of imported varieties. As our dependent variables
are at the firm level, τi,t−1 corresponds to the firm-level input tariff. It is thus prefectly colinear with the
interaction term Ordinaryi ∗ τk,t−1 and is dropped from the estimation. Standard errors are clustered at the
firm level. *** indicates significance at the level of 1%.
Section 3.3.1 and run equation (1) with the logarithm of import prices at the firm-product-
country-time level as dependent variable. We control for HS6 level tariffs as well as firms’ size,
origin countries’ GDP and real exchange rates. As shown in previous studies (e.g., Manova
and Zhang, 2012, Harrigan and Ma, 2012, Berman, Martin and Mayer, 2012), these variables
are significant determinants of import and export prices. Origin country fixed effects control
for distance and general supply conditions.
The coefficient on input tariffs for ordinary firms is negative and highly significant: A
decline in input tariffs is associated with an increase in within firm HS6 (f.o.b.) imported
inputs prices over time and across countries of origin. Relying on column (2), a 10 percentage
point fall in input tariffs raises imported input prices by 18.5% relative to processing firms.
Next we distinguish firms by the level of income of the inputs sourcing country. We include
an interaction term between HS6 input tariffs, firms’ ordinary type and an importer dummy
accounting for the main sourcing country of their inputs (DC/LDC).24 Importantly, as shown
in column (3) and (4), the effect of input tariffs on imported input prices is almost twice as
large if the inputs come from developed rather than from developing countries. In a recent
paper, De Loecker et al. (2012) found that a decrease in input tariffs tends to lower the
marginal cost. Their findings do not conflict with ours as imported input prices from the
Chinese customs database do not include the import tax. The marginal cost may not reflect
the higher prices of upgraded imported inputs as the extra cost may be offset by the fall in
tariffs.
24This dummy variable takes a value of one if the firm imports more than 50% of their inputs from developed
economies and zero otherwise.
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As expected, bigger firms have higher imported inputs prices and a depreciation of the real
exchange rate results in a large increase in these prices - a 10% depreciation induces an average
increase of 21%.25 In the presence of origin-country fixed effects, the GDP variable captures
GDP growth over time. It is thus non-surprising that imported inputs from countries with the
highest GDP growth (i.e., developping countries) show the lower increase in imported input
prices.
A lack of competition among HS6 level foreign input producers may favor an increase in
imported input prices unrelated to the firm endogenous choice of inputs quality. In order to
test for this alternative explanation of the increase in imported input prices, we introduce a
measure of concentration reflecting the market power of input suppliers. We built a HS6 level
Herfindahl index capturing the concentration of input suppliers according to their country of
origin (i.e., the sum of squared market shares of imports by countries of origin). Columns
(5) and (6) of Table 3 shows that the introduction of this variable does not modify our main
results. As for our supplier concentration index, it appears positively but has no significantly
impact.
Finally, one may argue that the change in imported input prices is caused by a surge in
raw material and energy prices over the 2000-2006 period. This increase in input price is
partially captured by the year fixed effects, but as usage of raw material and energy may vary
per sector, we test the robustness of our results through the exclusion of raw material and
energy from the firm’s input mix.26 The exclusion of raw material and energy does not alter
our main findings - the coefficient for input tariffs is almost unchanged (see Columns (7) and
(8) of Table 3).
The increase in input prices may also reflect a pass through effect as exporters to China
take advantage of the Chinese unilateral trade liberalization to increase their (f.o.b.) prices.
This pass-through effect should be stronger in sectors where suppliers have a high market
power. The inclusion of supplier concentration index does not however modify our main
results. Furthermore, this alternative explanation does not rationalize the increase in the
number of imported inputs from developed economies revealed in Table 2 and the fact that
imported input prices increase more for intermediate good originates from the most advanced
economies.
To sum up, our results show that firms facing a decrease in inputs tariffs buy more varieties
of inputs from developed countries and pay a higher price for theses inputs, suggesting a within
firm-product quality upgrading of imported inputs.
25Most Chinese trade is invoiced in U.S. dollars (see Manova and Zhang, 2012), we thus include the exchange
rate of foreign currency for US dollars. A depreciation here means that the exchange rate decreases.
26We exclude all products with HS6 codes below 300,000.
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4.2 Export prices and trade liberalization
We are interested in the evolution of exported product quality (price) following trade liber-
alization. The literature so far shows a correlation between high-quality (price) output and
high-quality (price) inputs but it does not explore the causal role of decreasing input tariffs
on both imported inputs and exported products quality upgrading.27 In order to capture
the effect of input-trade liberalization on within firm-product export prices, we include firm-
product, destination and year fixed effects in our estimation. We thus explore how within
firm variations in product unit values (across countries and over time) relate to within firm
reductions of input tariffs. Relative to the previous literature, this specification allows us to
test the effect of input-trade liberalization on within firm-product export prices while using a
control group (i.e., processing firms) for which variations in export prices are independent of
the fall in input tariffs. We thus interpret our estimates as a causal effect of a reduction in
input tariffs on within firm-product export prices.
A change in export prices following a trade liberalization episode may reflect either a
variation in quality, as firms take advantage of the tariffs cut to upgrade input quality thereby
improving the quality of exported products, or a change in the markup, as firms increase
their markup by a limited pass-through of cost reduction to consumers.28 An increase in the
markup following a decrease in input costs (e.g., input tariffs cut) is however unlikely to raise
export prices above the pre-trade liberalization level because of fierce competition on export
markets. We thus argue that an increase in (f.o.b.) export prices would be unlikely to reflect
an increase in the markup.29
Table 4 presents the results. We run equation (2) with firm-product-destination-time
export prices as dependent variable. Columns (1) and (2) show estimates of the impact of the
tariff cut on export prices by interacting firm-level input tariffs with the firm import status
(i.e., ordinary or processing). Columns (3) and (4) specify whether the imports originated from
developed or developing countries. Finally, columns (5) and (6) consider only the subsample
of product exported to high income countries whereas columns (7) and (8) focus on exported
products toward low income countries. As for the estimation of imported input prices, we
27Recent papers focus on the determinants of within product (or within product-destination) variations in
export prices across firms or within firm-product variations across destinations in a cross-section analysis (e.g.,
Bastos and Silva, 2010, for Portugal, Gorg, Halpern and Murakovy, 2010, for Hungary, Martin, 2012, for France,
Manova and Zhang, 2012, for China, Harrigan, Ma and Shlychkov, 2012, for US and Kugler and Verhoogen,
2011, for Colombia). Note that Kugler and Verhoogen (2011) use a panel of Colombian firms to show that
bigger firms set higher output prices and pay higher input prices within product-year pairs. In their study, they
compare prices across firms selling the same product in the same year.
28De Loecker et al. (2012), propose a new methodology based on the estimation of a translog production
function in order to retrieve measures of firms’ markups, marginal costs and productivity. We cannot replicate
their strategy as we do not have data for domestic production and output prices at the product level.
29In section 5.2.1, we present alternative measures of quality at the firm-product level following the method-
ology of Khandelwal, Schott and Wei (forthcoming) that relies on an estimation of the demand function.
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control for firm size, the GDP of destination countries and real exchange rates. Destination
fixed effects provide control for distance and general demand conditions.30
The input tariff reduction has a positive and significant impact on ordinary importers’
export prices. Relying on column (2) of Table 4, a 10 percentage point fall in input tariffs
increases export prices by 1.2%. This is small effect of trade liberalization on export prices.
This result is however in line with the findings of De Loecker and al. (2012). Their work
focuses on within firm-product variation of output prices over time and they find a small
impact (i.e., coefficient of -0.111) of the output tariff reduction on domestic Indian prices.
Note that, the role of input tariffs in explaining the difference in export prices across firms
(instead of within firm-product, i.e., with no causal effects) provides much bigger estimates. In
Table A4 in the Appendix, we estimate export prices variation across firms including product-
destination-year fixed effects. The coefficient is -0.849, suggesting that ordinary firms with
lower input tariffs charge higher export prices. The difference in magnitude with our casual
estimation results from the fact that our analysis of the within firm-product effect of trade
liberalization does not capture variations across firms nor variations of export prices related to
entry of new, more expensive products on the export market (i.e., a product selection effect).
The impact of the input tariff reduction on export prices is specific to inputs imported
from developed economies. it has no significant effect if the imports come from less developed
countries (see column (4)). Furthermore, in line with Hallak and Schott (2011) or Khandelwal
(2010), we find a link between export quality and countries’ level of development. As shown
in columns (5) and (7), the quality upgrading effect is specific to products that are exported
to high income countries.
Bigger firms have higher export prices and a depreciation in the real exchange rate results
in an increase in export prices: a 10% depreciation induces an average increase in export
prices of 0.67%. Chinese exporters take advantage of their currency depreciation to increase
their export prices (i.e, partial pass-through effect). Berman, Martin and Mayer (2012) find a
similar elasticity of 0.8% using French data. Note that the effect of exchange rate depreciation
on import prices was much larger as the currency depreciation is directly reflected in higher
imported inputs prices (see Table 3).31
30The decrease in Chinese output tariffs raises the competitive pressure on domestic producers but has no
direct effect on competition abroad (i.e., it should not directly affect export prices). Competition in foreign
markets becomes fiercer for Chinese firms if foreign countries were to modify their trade and competition policy;
Note that it would affect Chinese ordinary and processing firms similarly. In Section 5.1.2, we verify that our
results are robust against the inclusion of export markets output tariffs in the estimation, thus controlling for
product competition in the destination country.
31The input tariff cut impacts imported input prices and export prices quite differently. As shown in Table 3
and Table 4, the magnitude of the effect (size of coefficients) is indeed much bigger for imports than exports.
This could at least partly be due to a pass-through effect on the import side.
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Overall, our results are in line with a story where ordinary firms take advantage of trade
liberalization to upgrade their imported inputs in order to improve the quality of their exports.
The alternative explanation that firms exploit reduced imported input cost to increase their
markups is difficult to reconcile with the fact that (i) the price of imported inputs increase
and (ii) only the fall of input tariffs from developed economies is relevant to explaining export
prices growth.
5 Alternative explanations and discussion
There are several potential explanations for the increase in export prices over the 2000-2006
period, with the Chinese trade liberalization and its effect on imported input prices being one
of them. In this section, we discuss and examine alternative explanations. We first clarify our
strategies to control for these alternative factors. We then discuss influential elements ensuring
that we are effectively capturing a quality upgrading effect.
5.1 Alternative explanations
5.1.1 Controlling for shocks specific to ordinary or processing firms
Processing and ordinary firms differ on several dimensions. Processing firms are often owned
by foreigners (84% of foreign-owned firms import through processing trade regime), they have
higher credit constraints (Manova and Yu, 2012) and lower productivity (Yu and Tian, 2012)
than ordinary firms. These differences across firms groups are captured by the firm-product
fixed effects that control for unobservable characteristics affecting firms and products that
do not vary over time. However, specific exogenous shocks affecting differently ordinary and
processing firms may explain the change in export prices over the period and consequently
bias our results. Furthermore, comparing firms from ordinary and processing trade regime
that export the same HS6 product to the same destination in the same year does not insure
that firms would have followed the same export pattern over time in the absence of input tariff
reductions. Time-varying factors other than tariffs may have a different impact on ordinary
and processing export prices (for example if the Chinese government enforced the quality
upgrade of state-owned firms which are highly represented in ordinary - 80% of state-owned
firms import intermediates through the ordinary trade regime - or if processing firms benefit
from specific export advantages other than being duty free).32
This section presents an additional sensitivity test showing that our results are robust to
32Processing firms may also be too different from ordinary firms in term of size or objectives to represent a
good control group. In section 6.2, we alleviate these concerns by restricting our sample to the biggest firms,
excluding multinationals firms or specific sectors and considering only private firms.
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time-varying shocks affecting differently ordinary and processing firms over time. We include a
time-trend for ordinary firm in our specifications (i.e., an interaction term between time dummy
and firms status). Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 present these results. While the interaction
terms between ordinary status and year dummies are negative and statistically significant, our
coefficients of interest on the interaction term between input tariffs and ordinary status remain
robust and stable under this specification. Controlling for status specific time shocks does not
alter our findings on the impact of input-trade liberalization on export prices.
5.1.2 Demand shocks
An increase in export prices may result from greater demand for a specific HS6-product unre-
lated to product quality. The export prices of firms rise because they increase their markups
and/or because producing more output raises the demand for imported inputs which may
entail higher input prices. If this increase in demand occurs in HS6-products whose produc-
tion requires inputs facing the highest tariffs cut, our estimation becomes spurious. Similarly,
export prices may be affected by product-destination specific variables that influence compe-
tition in export markets. For example, output tariffs and non-tariff barriers in the destination
country may have a substantial impact on export prices. We control for such exogenous shocks
in demand and competition at destination by introducing product-destination-year fixed ef-
fects in the estimation. Note that these product-destination-year fixed effects also control for
sector-year variations such as inflation trend. Results are presented in Table 5 columns (3) and
(4). Pass-through effects are also of particular interest. They would occur if firms increase
their markups in response to a reduction in output tariffs in the export market. We thus
introduce the output tariff at destination at the HS6-product level in the estimation (columns
(5) and (6) of Table 5). Our results remain robust and stable with the inclusion of product-
destination-year fixed effects and output tariffs in destination countries.33 Unsurprisingly, the
coefficient on export markets output tariffs is negative and significant. Chinese exporters take
advantage of the decrease in the tariffs on foreign markets to increase their (f.o.b.) export
prices (partial pass-through effect).
33The sample size is reduced in columns (5) and (6) since output tariffs in destination markets at the HS6
level are not available for all destination countries of our database.
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5.1.3 Higher marginal costs
Of course, the increase in export prices may also result from higher marginal costs. The year
fixed effects capture costs increase affecting all firms similarly but do not provide control for
sector specific changes in production costs. In order to account for sectoral increase in marginal
cost, we first introduce sectoral wages which reflect changes in sectoral labor costs. Wages at
the sectoral-year level are constructed using the ORBIS firm-level dataset from Bureau Van
Dijk.34 Mainly representative of medium and large firms in the manufacturing sector (recall
that larger firms are more likely to export), the ORBIS dataset includes an average of 130,000
Chinese firms per year over the 2000-2006 period and contains detailed firm level information
on wages. Sectoral wages are associated with the median wage paid by all firms producing for
the same 3-digit NACE industrial classification. Using correspondence tables between NACE
and HS classification, we match sectoral (HS2) wages with our firms from the Chinese customs
trade dataset. Columns (7) and (8) of Table 5 show that the introduction of this sectoral
cost variable does not modify our main results. Wages unsurprisingly correlate positively and
significantly with export prices.
Higher export prices may also result from a lack of competition among HS6 level foreign
input suppliers or a surge in raw material and energy prices over the 2000-2006 period. In
both cases, export prices increase because imported inputs are more expensive. However,
as shown in Table 2, controlling for the concentration of input suppliers and excluding raw
material and energy from the set of inputs does not modify our results: As input tariffs fall,
imported input prices increase independenlty of the lack of competition of suppliers and the
raise in primary product prices. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, we introduce the supplier
Herfindahl index in a regression which estimates the export prices. As for input tariffs, firm
level supplier Herfindahl indices are computed as a weighted average of the HS6 Herfindahl
on inputs used by the firm, with weights remaining constant over time, and corresponding to
the average weight of specific import values of HS6 products over the period. Usage of raw
material and energy varies across firms’ export sector, we thus compute the firm level input
tariff ignoring these inputs for the input mix of the firm. As expected, including the Herfindahl
index and excluding raw material and energy does not modify our main results (the Herfindahl
has a positive sign but is once again not significant). These results are available upon request.
Overall, we find little evidence that the link between the cut in input tariffs and the
increase in export prices actually reflects an increase in sectoral production cost in a sector
with substantial tariffs cut. Our results on the impact of input-trade liberalization on export
34Bureau Van Dijk provides company information for over a 100 million companies around the globe. See
https://orbis.bvdinfo.com for further information
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prices is robust to the inclusion of the firms’ production costs. This supports the explanation
of an exported products quality upgrading.
5.2 An upgrade in product quality?
Prices (unit values) are imperfect measures of product quality. An increase in price may
indeed reflect higher markups or marginal costs rather than quality upgrading. In the previous
section, we attempted to control for these alternative channels and showed that the Chinese
trade liberalization, through its reduction in inputs tariffs, increase both imported inputs and
export prices independently of product specific demand shock (i.e., markups effects) and cost
increases. In this section, we set out several arguments that endorse our prior hypothesis of a
product quality upgrading.
First, as shown in Table 6, the cut in input tariffs is associated with a firm-product increase
in imported and exported quantities as well as in prices. The concomitance of the increase in
imported inputs and export prices as well as imported inputs and export quantities consecutive
to a decrease in input tariffs and controlling for firms which have not experienced such tariff
cuts is suggestive of a quality upgrading effect. Indeed, while an increase in demand may
raise both the quantity and price of exported products and a sourcing effect may increase the
quantity and price of imported inputs, it should affect ordinary and processing firms similarly
and should be unrelated to the magnitude of the input tariffs cut.
Moreover, our baseline estimations as well as all other tests presented in this paper show
that the increase in export prices related to the imported inputs tariffs cut is specific to firms
that mainly source their inputs from developed countries. What comes in mind is a scenario
whereby firms take advantage of the reduced input tariffs to increase the number and quality of
products they import from developed economies producing higher quality inputs. In order to
explore this hypothesis, we perform several informative tests, which reinforce the main findings
of Section 4.1. First, we examine the evolution in the number of DC and LDC sourcing partners
at the firm-product level over the period. We include only firm-imported product pairs that
are present in both 2000 and 2006 in order to capture changes in the number and type of
suppliers within firm-imported product. It is interesting to note that ordinary firms increased
their number of sourcing partners from DC by 10.8% over the period, while the number of
sourcing partners from LDCs rose by only 4.7%. Processing firms present the opposite sourcing
behaviors: the number of DC suppliers increased by 2.4% while the number of suppliers from
LDC increased by 4.3%. Firms benefiting from the tariff cut thus increased their number of
DC suppliers two times more than their number of LDC suppliers - this feature is not common
to firms exempt from tariffs. The trade liberalization allowed ordinary firms to source inputs
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Table 6: Input tariffs and firms’ import and export quantities
Dependent variable: Export prices (f.o.b.) of firm i for product k in country c and year t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quantity imports Quantity exports
Tariff(t-1)× ordinary -1.977*** -0.122*
(0.237) (0.065)
Tariff(t-1)× ordinary DC -2.022*** -0.127*
(0.238) (0.068)
Tariff(t-1)× ordinary LDC -1.626*** 0.033
(0.301) (0.191)
RER(t-1) -0.038 -0.034 0.022 0.022
(0.039) (0.039) (0.019) (0.019)
GDP(t-1) 0.301*** 0.303*** 0.309*** 0.309***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.038) (0.038)
Size Q1 -0.492*** -0.492*** -0.138*** -0.140***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.011) (0.011)
Size Q2 -0.261*** -0.261*** -0.124*** -0.124***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010)
Size Q3 -0.139*** -0.139*** -0.085*** -0.085***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008)
Firm-hs6 product fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Destination country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 2,286,393 2,286,393 3,208,497 3,208,497
R-squared 0.842 0.842 0.721 0.721
Notes: Recall that τi,t−1 is a firm level variable which is prefectly colinear with the interaction term Ordinaryi∗
τk,t−1 and therefore drops from the estimation. In columns (2) and (4), we also include not reported dummy
variables for importers from DC and LDC. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-product level. Significance:
***, **, * indicate significance at the level of 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
from more advanced (i.e., higher quality products) markets.
We find very few switches from LDC originated imported inputs to DC originated imported
inputs at the product level. In most cases, firms added new suppliers from more advanced
economies to their set of existing trade partners. As shown in Table 7, this is especially true
for firms that already imported a majority of inputs from DCs; they took advantage of the
tariffs’ cut to increase the number of varieties they import from these advanced economies. We
investigated more carefully the origin of new imported varieties. We defined a new imported
input variety as an intermediate good import transaction at the firm-product-country of origin
level that is active in 2006 but did not exist in 2000. We then estimated the correlation between
new imported varieties and the level of development of the source country by relying in the
following equation: Newkc = β1GDPc + β1RERc + αk + ηkc. Newkc takes a value of 1 if
the variety at the product-country of origin level is new in 2006, it is zero otherwise. GDPc
and RERc correspond to the GDP for 2006 in the country of origin and the bilateral real
exchange rate between China and the country of origin in 2006. αk controls for the product
dimension. Both the coefficients for GDP and RER are positive and highly significant (at the
1% level). The higher the GDP of the supplier and the stronger the Chinese currency relative
to its supplier, the more likely Chinese firms will import a product from this country. This
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confirms the positive link between new imported inputs and supplier level of development, and
is suggestive of quality upgrading.
Table 7: Input tariffs and number of DC/LDC suppliers of ordinary importers
Importers mainly from DC Importers mainly from LDC
N imported N imported N imported N imported
varieties DC varieties LDC varieties DC varieties LDC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tariff(t-1)× ordinary -0.602*** 0.044 -0.823 -0.263
(0.108) (0.327) (0.942) (0.318)
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 151,808 43,118 15,201 24,793
R-squared 0.873 0.839 0.885 0.924
Notes: Table 7 presents the results of the following equation: numbit = β1Ordinaryi ∗ τi,t−1 + β2τi,t−1 + αi +
αt + ηit where numbit correspond to the log of the number of imported variety for different type of importers
(i.e, mainly DC or mainly LDC) and of suppliers (i.e., DC or LDC). As our dependent variables are at the firm
level, τi,t−1 corresponds to the firm-level input tariff. It is thus prefectly colinear with the interaction term
Ordinaryi ∗ τk,t−1 and is dropped from the estimation.. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***,
**, * indicate significance at the level of 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
5.2.1 Alternative quality measures
In this section, we enhance our measure of quality using insights from Khandelwal’s work.
Khandelwal (2010) proposes a measure of quality that accounts not only for product prices
but also for market shares. Whereas Khandelwal (2010)’s methodology evaluates quality at
the product level, Khandelwal, Schott and Wei (forthcoming) (KSW hereafter) show that by
relying on an utility function which accounts for product quality as in Section 2 and taking logs
on the corresponding demand, the quality for each firm-product-country-year observation can
be estimated. It corresponds to the residual of an OLS estimation of the following regression:
xikct + σpikct = αk + αct + ηikct (3)
where xikct and pikct denote the natural logs of the quantity and price of product k produced
by firm i and sold in market c in t. The country-time fixed effect αct controls for price index
and income at destination, while the product fixed effect αk controls for variation across
products. The estimated log quality, λikct , depends on the residual ηikct and the elasticity
of substitution σ: λikct = ηikct/(σ − 1). We estimate quality following this method using our
Chinese custom database and then use the estimated quality, λikct, as the dependent variable
in our baseline estimation. For the elasticity of substitution, we chose σ = 6.35 We also
adapt KSW’s estimation to the import side with xikct and pikct representing the natural logs
35This σ corresponds to the Chinese median elasticity of substitution across sectors according to Broda,
Greenfield and Weinstein (2006).
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of the quantity and price of product k imported by firm i from market c in t. Our results,
presented in columns (1) to (4) of Table 8 are robust to alternative choices of σ. Importantly,
the coefficient on firms input tariffs for ordinary firms remains negative and significant. The
Chinese trade liberalization, through its decrease in inputs tariffs, allows firms to upgrade the
quality of their imported inputs and exported products.
Overall, refining our measure of exported product quality confirms and reinforces our
hypothesis that firms take advantage of the unilateral trade liberalization to buy higher quality
inputs in order to increase the quality of their exported products.36
Table 8: Alternative measure of quality
Dependent variable: Export prices (f.o.b.) of firm i for product k in country c and year t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
KSW KSW Homogeneous vs.
quality quality Differenciated
Imports Exports
Tariff(t-1)× ordinary -1.525*** -0.080** 0.062
(0.158) (0.034) (0.094)
Tariff(t-1)× ordinary DC -1.728*** -0.102*** 0.003
(0.160) (0.036) (0.058)
Tariff(t-1)× ordinary LDC -1.229*** 0.032 0.195
(0.208) (0.102) (0.137)
Tariff(t-1)× ordinary×Rauch -0.198**
(0.098)
Tariff(t-1)× ordinary DC× Rauch -0.157***
(0.039)
Tariff(t-1)× ordinary LDC× Rauch -0.198
(0.127)
Tariff(t-1) -1.518*** -1.582***
(0.079) (0.079)
RER(t-1) 0.168*** 0.193*** 0.046*** 0.046*** -0.067*** -0.067***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
GDP(t-1) 0.217*** 0.261*** -0.199*** -0.199*** 0.003 0.003
(0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013)
Size Q1 -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.018*** -0.016***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Size Q2 -0.051** -0.051** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.017*** -0.018***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Size Q3 0.018** 0.018** -0.012*** -0.012*** 0.001 0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Firm-hs6 product fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Destination/origin country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2,286,393 2,286,393 3,208,497 3,208,497 3,208,497 3,208,497
R-squared 0.897 0.897 0.897 0.897 0.915 0.915
Notes: Recall that τi,t−1 is a firm level variable which is prefectly colinear with the interaction term Ordinaryi∗
τk,t−1 and therefore drops from the estimation. In columns (2) , (4) and (6) we also include not reported dummy
variables for importers from DC and LDC. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-product level. ***, **, *
indicate significance at the level of 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
36The changing sign of the RER coefficient may reflect the fact that a depreciation of the Chinese currency
leads to buying lower quality inputs and consequently exporting lower quality products. On the import side,
the positive and significant coefficient on GDP shows that the higher the growth rate in the origin country of
imports, the higer the increase in quality following the input-trade liberalization.
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5.2.2 Distinguishing homogeneous from differentiated products.
In the same way, we expect the effect of input tariff reduction on export prices via quality
upgrading to be stronger for differentiated goods than for homogeneous goods. While change
unrelated to quality may affect the prices of both types of products similarly, price changes
related to quality specifically concern differentiated products: the more differentiated the
product, the higher the potential gains from increase quality. This is reflected in columns
(5) and (6) of Table 8, where the interaction term between firm input tariffs and ordinary
status is further interacted with a dummy variable capturing the Rauch (1999) classification
of products according to their degree of differentiation. The Rauch dummy takes a value of one
when products are differentiated (products are otherwise price-referenced or homogeneous).
The coefficient on the triple interaction term between firm input tariffs, ordinary status and
Rauch is negative and significant implying that the effect of input tariff cuts on export prices
is greater for ordinary firms exporting differenciated products. This again suggests that we
capture the effect of trade liberalization on exported products quality.
6 Robustness checks
We now move on to several robustness checks. First, we discuss and test our measure of
input tariffs. Second, we confront our findings to alternative samples to ensure that our
findings are not driven by intrinsic differences between ordinary and processing firms in term
of size, sector/product characteristics and firm-ownership. Finally, we present alternative
specifications concerning the hypothesis on the correlation of standard errors.
6.1 Alternative input tariffs
Input tariffs are constructed as a weighted average of tariffs on inputs used in the production
of a firm final output, where the weights are constant over the period. Weights are computed
as the average import value of a specific input HS6 product over the period. This measure
is free of potential reverse causality concerns regarding possible variations in firms’ export
prices that might affect changes in firms’ choice of imported inputs. This firm level input tariff
measure also avoids potential biased estimates stemming from changes in the composition of
input mix over time due to input tariff reductions. The main advantage of using these weights
thus lies in their stability over time.
Our measure of firm level input tariffs is however not perfect. Average weights of HS6
products experiencing the most important drop in tariffs are likely to be high. In the initial
year, inputs with high tariffs were scarcely used (i.e., low weight), a sharp decrease in tar-
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iffs however shifted demand toward these inputs, drastically raising their import shares and
thereby their average weights. Nevertheless for our requirements, as long as the high average
weights results from the tariffs cut, we appropriately captured change in imported input costs
entailed by trade liberalization. If the change in weights is exogenous to the change in tariffs
our results may however be biased upward. In order to insure that our results are not driven
by our tariff specification, we propose three alternative tests.
We first verified that at the firm-product level a tariff cut is associated with an increase
in import value and therefore in relative weight. We therefore ran a specification similar
to (1) with the import value as the dependent variable. We found a coefficient of -3.317
for the tariff*Ordinary explanatory variable, significant at the 1% level. This suggests that
changes in imported input weights are related to trade liberalization. Second, we ran our main
regression on export prices (i.e., equation (2)) using tariffs constructed with the firm’s initial
input weights. This measure of tariffs gives a low weight to inputs with the initial highest
tariffs. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 show the results. Our findings on the impact of trade
liberalization on export prices are robust to this alternative tariff measure.
Table 9: Input tariffs and firms’ export: Alternative tariffs
Dependent variable: Export prices (f.o.b.) of firm i for product k in country c and year t
Initial weights IO weights
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tariff(t-1)× ordinary -0.185** -0.065
(0.077) (0.050)
Tariff(t-1)× ordinary DC -0.173** -0.133***
(0.077) (0.049)
Tariff(t-1)× ordinary LDC -0.708 -0.195
(0.513) (0.101)
Input tariffs IO 0.580*** 0.591***
(0.033) (0.034)
RER(t-1) -0.009 -0.009 -0.063*** -0.063***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007)
GDP(t-1) 0.096*** 0.096*** -0.002 -0.003
(0.025) (0.025) (0.013) (0.013)
Size Q1 -0.000 0.004 -0.014*** -0.012**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005)
Size Q2 -0.018** -0.018** -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004)
Firm-hs6 fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Destination country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 760,058 760,058 3,197,215 3,197,215
R-squared 0.931 0.931 0.915 0.915
Notes: Recall that τi,t−1 is a firm level variable which is prefectly colinear with the interaction term Ordinaryi∗
τk,t−1 and therefore drops from the estimation. In columns (2) and (4), we include not reported dummy variables
for ordinary and processing importers from DC and LDC. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-product
level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the level of 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
Finally, we use Chinese Input-Output (IO) tables for 2002 from the National Bureau of
Statistics of China (NBSC) for 122 industries in order to construct an alternative exogenous
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measure of input tariffs. Such measures are much less precise (data are at the 2-digit HS
level) and do not reflect the input mix of the firm. Weights correspond to the shares of
HS2 sectors in the production of a given HS2 sector. For each firm-exported product, we
associate the corresponding HS2 input tariff derived from the IO table. In contrast to our
other specifications, tariffs vary at the HS2-year level and are not specific to the firm. We thus
need to slightly modify our specification and include the HS2 tariff as a control variable in the
estimation. Results are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 9. It is however important to
note that, despite the highly aggregated feature of IO table data and the imprecise measure
of firms input tariffs, our results are fairly robust to this alternative measure of tariffs.
6.2 Are processing a good control group: alternative samples
Processing firms might be quite different from firms that export through ordinary trade in term
of size, ownership, exported products and destination markets. By restricting our sample to
ordinary firms for which there is at least one corresponding processing firm at the product-
destination-year level, we ensure a geographic and sectoral overlapping across the treated and
control groups. Although time-invariant differences in firm-level attributes are controlled for
by the fixed effects, one may wonder whether large discrepancies in size or ownership across
the two groups may affect the results. In order to alleviate this concern, we run our baseline
estimation on a subsample of ordinary and processing firms which are similar in term of size
in addition to exporting the same product to the same destination markets in the same year.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 10 report results for firms with size higher than the median. As
shown in the table, using this alternative sample does not modify our main results.37
We also verified that our results are not related to ownership status. Foreign-owned firms
are present both under the ordinary and the processing trade regime, they were however
historically the first to benefit from the processing trade regime and are highly represented
under this status. If processing firms are simply assembling product for foreign multinationals,
do they really choose the quality of their imported and exported products? In contrast, state-
owned firms are primarily importing intermediates through the ordinary trade regime. Since
firm-ownership might be correlated with trade regime, firms objectives might be quite different
across the treated and the control groups and/or specific shocks related to the ownership status
might affect export prices differently across ordinary and processing firms.
We already addressed this concern by including a time trend on the ordinary dummy
variable thereby capturing time varying specific shocks affecting processing and ordinary firms
differently. As an alternative robustness test, we exclude foreign firms from the estimated
37We also tested for different size thresholds. Results are similar and available upon request.
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Table 10: Alternative samples: size and ownership status.
Dependent variable: Export prices (f.o.b.) of firm i for product k in country c and year t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Similar size Excluding foreign firms Only private firms
Tariff(t-1)× ordinary -0.148*** -0.163*** -0.071
(0.049) (0.032) (0.060)
Tariff(t-1)× ordinary DC -0.195*** -0.186*** -0.141**
(0.052) (0.034) (0.064)
Tariff(t-1)× ordinary LDC -0.037 -0.090 0.208
(0.146) (0.096) (0.164)
RER(t-1) -0.233*** -0.233*** -0.086*** -0.087*** -0.219*** -0.218***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.009) (0.009) (0.024) (0.024)
GDP(t-1) -0.053 -0.054 0.011 0.011 0.093*** 0.092***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.017) (0.017) (0.035) (0.035)
Size Q1 0.004 0.007 -0.012** -0.010* 0.004 0.005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011)
Size Q2 -0.005 -0.005 -0.012** -0.013** -0.017* -0.020*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010)
Size Q3 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.008* 0.008* 0.027*** 0.025***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009)
Firm-hs6 fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Destination fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,245,140 1,245,140 2,438,305 2,438,305 977,880 977,880
R-squared 0.910 0.910 0.905 0.905 0.903 0.903
Notes: Recall that τi,t−1 is a firm level variable which is prefectly colinear with the interaction term Ordinaryi∗
τk,t−1 and therefore drops from the estimation. In columns (2), (4) and (6), we include not reported dummy
variables for importers from DC and LDC. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-product level. ***, **, *
indicate significance at the level of 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
sample. Table 10, columns (3) and (4), provides the results. In columns (5) and (6), we
restrict the estimated sample to private firms. As shown in the table, our baseline results are
not driven by time-varying shocks affecting foreign-owned or state-owned firms differently nor
by the distinct nature (and diverging incentives) of processing and ordinary firms.38
Similarly, Electronics and Textile are highly represented in processing trade activities and
encountered drastic trade changes over the period (i.e., the phasing out of the Multifiber
Agreement).39 We checked whether our results could be driven by these two important sectors.
We ran our baseline regressions excluding textile (exported products corresponding to HS2
codes higher than 50 and lower than 63), electronics (products corresponding to HS2 codes
85) and raw materials (all products with HS2 codes below 30) in turns. Table 11 shows that,
by and large, omitting these sectors does not modify the results.
38As common in the literature when working with unit values and because of potential noise in these vari-
ables, we exclude transactions with the 1% biggest and lowest unit values from our database (We also tested
alternative threshold for outliers). Results, available upon request, are similar to the ones obtained in our
baseline specifications
39Khandelwal, Schott and Wei (forthcoming) investigate the patterns of Chinese exporters before and after
the elimination of externally imposed export quotas.
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Table 11: Alternative samples: controlling for specific sectors
Dependent variable: Export prices (f.o.b.) of firm i for product k in country c and year t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No textile No electronic No raw materials
Tariff(t-1)× ordinary -0.084** -0.144*** -0.126***
(0.033) (0.031) (0.031)
Tariff(t-1)× ord DC -0.115*** -0.170*** -0.148***
(0.035) (0.032) (0.032)
Tariff(t-1)× ord LDC 0.073 -0.027 -0.027
(0.099) (0.096) (0.094)
RER(t-1) -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.066*** -0.066***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
GDP(t-1) 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.002 0.002
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Size Q1 -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.015***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Size Q2 -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.018***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Size Q3 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Firm-hs6 fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Destination fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2,540,343 2,540,343 2,845,063 2,845,063 3,173,145 3,173,145
R-squared 0.914 0.914 0.912 0.912 0.915 0.915
Notes: Recall that τi,t−1 is a firm level variable which is prefectly colinear with the interaction term Ordinaryi∗
τk,t−1 and therefore drops from the estimation. In columns (2), (4) and (6), we include not reported dummy
variables for importers from DC and LDC. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-product level. ***, **, *
indicate significance at the level of 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
6.3 Alternative specifications
In the previous specifications we chose to cluster standard errors at the firm-product level.
The rationale for this choice is based on the fact that we did not observe firm-product level
input tariffs due to data limitations (there was no information on the allocation of inputs for
multi-products firms) while firm-product standard errors might be correlated over time across
destinations (origins). Nevertheless, since we relied on input tariffs at the firm level varying
over time, standard errors might also be correlated within firms and over time. Columns (3)
and (4) of Table 12 presents an alternative specification with standard errors clustered at the
firm-year level. All the variables of interest remain robust and stable under this alternative
clustering method. Finally, since the structure of the data is at the firm-product-destination
level, we also present an additional test relying on multi-way clustering with standard errors
clustered at the firm, HS6 product and country level following the methodology described by
Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2011) (columns (5) and (6)).
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Table 12: Alternative specifications
Dependent variable: Export prices (f.o.b.) of firm i for product k in country c and year t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cluster firm-year multi-way clustering firm-hs6-destination
Tariff(t-1)× ordinary -0.121** -0.121***
(0.049) (0.040)
Tariff(t-1)× ordinary DC -0.144*** -0.144***
(0.050) (0.032)
Tariff(t-1)× ordinary LDC -0.014 -0.014
(0.205) (0.093)
RER(t-1) -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.067***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.027) (0.027)
GDP(t-1) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.019) (0.019) (0.047) (0.047)
Size Q1 -0.018* -0.015 -0.018* -0.015**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Size Q2 -0.017** -0.018** -0.017** -0.018**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
Size Q3 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Firm-hs6 fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Destination country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 3208497 3208497 3208497 3208497
R-squared 0.915 0.915 0.915 0.915
Notes: Recall that τi,t−1 is a firm level variable which is prefectly colinear with the interaction term Ordinaryi∗
τk,t−1 and therefore drops from the estimation. In columns (2) and (4), we include not reported dummy variables
for importers from DC and LDC. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-product level. ***, **, * indicate
significance at the level of 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
7 Conclusions
The paper examines the impact of trade liberalization on the evolution of within firm-product
imported input and exported product prices. In order to identify causal links between cuts
in input tariffs and trade prices, we take advantage of a rich and unique database of Chinese
firms’ trade data that covers the Chinese accession to the WTO in 2001 and characterizes
trade transaction according to a dual regime where some firms are exempt from paying tariffs.
This is crucial to our approach as it allows us to rely on a quasi-natural experiment where
firms not subject to tariffs stand as the control group. We obtain two robust results: (i) firms
take advantage of the input-trade liberalization to increase both the number of inputs varieties
they import and the price of their imported varieties, and (ii) in response to the tariff cut,
ordinary firms (i.e., the treated group paying the tariffs) increase their export prices, especially
if the inputs are sourced from the most developed economies and the output is exported to
high income countries. Our results suggest a scenario where firms exploit the input trade
liberalization to upgrade the quality of their inputs in order to upgrade the quality of their
exported products. Indeed, the alternative explanation of higher export prices reflecting a rise
in markups is unlikely to be associated with higher imported input prices and to be specifically
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related to increased imports from the most developed economies.
The positive link between imported input prices and export prices, first revealed by Kugler
and Verhoogen (2012), is then confirmed within firm-product over time and across destinations,
following a trade liberalization episode. This result accentuates the positive role that unilateral
trade liberalization may have on firms and export performances. In addition to expanding the
number of goods produced and exported (see Goldberg et al. 2010, Bas and Strauss-Kahn
2012), input trade liberalization leads to an upgrade in product quality.
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8 Appendix
Figure A1: Share of HS6 sectors under various tariffs level
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Note: Based on Figure 2 of Brandt et al. (2012). Source: Author’s calculation using unweighted average tariff
rates from WITS.
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Table A1: Chinese Industrial Tariff Reduction between 2000 and 2006.
Industry name Change in tariffs Percentage reduction
(percentage points) in tariffs
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel -066 10.49
Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment -1.86 14.46
Leather and footwear -4.55 23.18
Non-metallic mineral products -4.39 26.26
other transport equipment -3.18 27.56
Basic metals -2.32 31.44
Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur -7.60 31.73
Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks -4.33 32.00
Tobacco products -18.83 33.04
Furniture -6.93 33.51
Rubber and plastics products -5.47 35.31
Machinery and equipment -5.24 35.50
Chemicals and chemical products -3.70 36.03
Electrical machinery -5.59 38.47
Food products and beverages -12.28 41.93
Radio., television and communication equipment -7.73 45.47
Textiles -10.23 50.00
Wood and products of wood and cork -6.34 55.32
Motor vehicules, trailers and semi-trailers -18.37 56.02
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media -5.56 57.26
Paper and paper products -9.07 61.20
Office, accounting and computing machinery -10.71 74.48
Notes: Author’s calculation using unweighted average tariff rates from WITS.
Table A2: Definition of the three main custom regimes.
Regime code Regime name Definition
10 Ordinary trade Unilateral imports or exports through customs
14 Processing and assembling The type of inward processing in which foreign suppliers provide raw materi-
als, parts or components under a contractual arrangment for the subsequent
re-exportation of the processed products. Under this type of transaction,
the imported inputs and the finished outputs remain property of the foreign
supplier.
15 Processing with imported ma-
terials
The type of inward processing other than processing and assembling in which
raw materials or components are imported from the manufacture of the export
oriented products, including those imported into Export Processing Zone and
the subsequent re-exportation of the processed products from the Zone.
Notes: The other custom regimes are: International aid, Donation by overseas Chinese, Compensation trade, Goods
on consignment, Border trade, Equipement imported for processing trade, Contracting projects, Goods on lease,
Equipement/materials investment by foreign-invested enterprise, Outward processing, Barter trade, Duty-free commod-
ity, Warehousing trade, Entrepot trade by bonded area, Other. Source: The General Administration of Customs of
China
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Table A3: Descriptive evidence of the sample (average over the period 2000-2006).
full sample estimated sample
Industry # firms # firms # ordinary # processing # products
name (shares) (shares) firms firms
Food products and beverages 8.4% 5.1% 891 415 95
Textiles 5.3% 5.8% 433 1,053 151
Wearing apparel; dressing and dyien 11.8% 15.5% 358 3,651 191
Leather and footwear 5.4% 5.9% 304 1,219 37
Wood and products of wood 1.9% 1.8% 285 186 27
Paper and paper products 2.8% 2.2% 294 262 40
Publishing, printing and reproduction 0.4% 0.4% 79 36 17
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 0.4% 0.0% 10 3 2
Chemicals 11.9% 6.9% 1360 422 183
Rubber and plastic products 18.8% 18.4% 2,460 2,281 87
Other non-metallic mineral products 3.5% 2.5% 412 230 71
Basic metals 2.2% 1.2% 178 141 81
Metal products 4.7% 5.3% 730 650 140
Machinery and equipement 6.0% 6.6% 983 575 232
Office, accounting and computing machinery 1.2% 1.5% 55 322 8
Electrical machinery 4.5% 5.3% 443 916 86
Radio, television and communication equipement 3.9% 4.3% 313 799 57
Medical, precision and optical instruments 1.7% 2.0% 169 347 117
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.7% 0.7% 142 46 19
Other transport equipement 0.4% 0.5% 42 81 22
Furniture 4.7% 7.1% 1433 136
Other sectors 0.0% 1.6% 182 221 20
Total 100% 100% 10,517 15,289 1,821
Total (# 42,398) (# 25,806)
Notes: Author’s calculation. The table report mean values over the period 2000-2006. The full sample corre-
sponds to all firms that export and import. Our estimated sample requires that firms are either ordinary or
processing and that for each treated firm (ordinary) there is a at least one control firm ( processing) at the
product-destination-year level.
Table A4: Across firms analysis of input tariffs on export prices.
Dependent variable: Export prices (f.o.b.) of firm i for product k in country c in year t
(1) (2)
Tariff(t-1)× ordinary -0.849*** -0.637***
(0.143) (0.141)
Ordinary importer -0.022 0.160***
(0.025) (0.052)
Tariff(t-1)× ordinary DC -0.883***
(0.161)
Tariff(t-1)× ordinary LDC -0.643**
(0.307)
Ordinary importer from DC -0.010
(0.027)
Ordinary importer from LDC -0.264***
(0.041)
Processing importer LDC -0.175***
(0.024)
Size Q1 -0.199*** -0.176***
(0.018) (0.018)
Size Q2 -0.152*** -0.157***
(0.018) (0.019)
Size Q3 -0.114*** -0.111***
(0.017) (0.017)
Product-destination-year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 3,208,497 3,208,497
R-squared 0.603 0.604
Notes:Recall that τi,t−1 is a firm level variable which is prefectly colinear with the interaction term Ordinaryi ∗
τk,t−1 and therefore drops from the estimation. Standard errors are custered at the firm level. ***, **, *
indicate significance at the level of 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
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